Besides information, decisions are importantly a¤ected by factors such as trust and familiarity. The paper explicitly studies the e¤ect of these factors, referred to as relational distance, on various contractual arrangements (guarantee, tied assistance and gift) commonly discussed in economics, in the context of …nancing a new venture. Given the relational distance between an informed family member and a credit-constrained entrepreneur, we show that these alternative relational contracts are not perfect substitutes; in fact, the family member has a pecking order among them. Besides, very close family, though informed, may not even be able to facilitate bank …nancing unless the family is wealthy. Thus, the entrepreneur must in turn choose her family who could help obtain a bank loan based on appropriate level of wealth and relational distance.
Introduction
Interaction, formal or informal, among players has long been recognized to be important for economic activities. Traders interact for purposes of exchange. Bank acquires familiarity with the borrowers in the process of loan disbursements and repayments over the course of the loan. Employees meet by the water cooler or during smoking breaks. Interaction generates information, breeds familiarity and creates trust. Features such as these form the basis for contracts that we refer to as relational contracts. 1 In this paper, we study the implications of the interplay between relational and non-relational contracts. In particular, how do the existence and nature of relational contract facilitate the availability and terms of non-relational contract? Of the players in a relational contract, can one player's actions a¤ect the non-relational contract obtained by the other player? How would the choice of player a¤ect the terms of the relational and non-relational contracts for the other player? We explore these questions in the context of family …nancing of new ventures.
Relational contracts are ubiquitous. For instance, input suppliers not only sell goods and services but also extend signi…cant amount of credit to their buyers. 2 While such contracts are often formal, relational contracts may also be informal. Neighbours extend emergency support to each other as a form of mutual insurance. Moneylenders in developing countries o¤er loans with no for- 1 Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) consider relational contracts to be informal, self-enforcing agreements based on the incentive to maintain reputation over time. Our de…nition is somewhat di¤erent. For our purposes, relational contracts do not necessarily have to be based on the value of future relationship. In fact, we focus on those contracts that are primarily based on past experience and interaction between the parties to the contract. The basis of the historical interaction need not be related to the activities being contracted upon. Moreover, relational contracts could be formal or informal. 2 Rajan and Zingales (1995) note that trade credit represented 17.8% of total assets of all U.S. …rms in 1991 and over a quarter of total corporate assets in major European countries. mal enforcability. The extant economics literature uses lower asymmetric information or repeated game arguments to justify such relational contracts. These arguments cannot explain evidence from experimental economics of cooperative behavior involving anonymously paired subjects. 3 Notions such as those of fairness, trust, familiarity, liking and comfort level, could lead to outcomes unexplained through the standard economic arguments. For instance, not all informed suppliers are seen o¤ering trade credit to their buyers; some neighbors are more willing to help than others. For the purposes of our paper, we use the term relational distance to refer to these other in ‡uences, besides information and repeated game considerations, on relational contracts. 4 We discuss relational distance in greater detail in Section 2 of the paper.
In this paper, we consider one natural domain of relational distance, namely kin. Family members, friends and neighbours (collectively referred to as "kin") typically meet often due to a sense of familiarity with and proximity to each other. They are likely to possess information about each other which is equally good. However, the relationship among family members is far from simple. 5 Relational distance, captured in notions of fondness and such like, a¤ects their decisions.
In particular, di¤erences in relational distance between family members with the same information, would lead to dissimilar choice of actions. For instance, a father may take di¤erent decisions when interacting with his son than with his daughter. A mother's reaction to her daughter may be di¤erent from the reaction of her aunt's. Thus, family provides an appropriate setup for analyzing the impact of relational distance on economic behavior and outcomes. 6 3 See Berg et al (1995) for one such experiment. 4 Petersen (2004) discusses the di¤erence between soft and hard information in the context of …nancial transaction. However, to a large extent, the di¤erence between the two is in terms of codi…ability or veri…ability of information and can be discussed within the information framework. 5 To verify this, one need only attend a typical Thanksgiving meal or Christmas dinner in one's own homes. 6 In the context of the family, relational distance may also be interpreted as a measure of altruism. While family members may care about the well-being of other members, the degree of altruism could vary signi…cantly. Becker (1981) , Bernheim and Stark (1988) , among others, have explored the implications of altruism in a variety of contexts, We consider the …nancing problem that an entrepreneur may face in starting a new venture and the role the family may play in this context. The prevelance of family funds in small ventures is well documented, both anecdotally and in large surveys. According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)-sponsored study, family business investments as a percent of informal investments was over 70 percent in India, over 60 percent in the UK, over 55 percent in Hungary and over 50 percent in the US (Astrachan et al (2003) ). 7 Such ventures provide a natural arena for exploring whether and how di¤erences in relational distance among family members a¤ect the interaction between relational (e.g., guarantees) and non-relational (e.g., bank loan) contracts. 8 In a standard adverse selection framework similar to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , we assume that entrepreneurs with positive and negative NPV projects are credit rationed due to asymmetric information between the bank and the entrepreneur. Better information about the entrepreneur, if made available to a bank, would facilitate the availability of a non-relational contract (in the form of a bank loan) for the entrepreneur's project but only if it is credible. Family is assumed to possess superior information about the entrepreneur vis-à-vis the bank. 9 We solve for a separating equlibrium in the three-player game, played by the bank, the entrepreneur and the entrepreneur's family. We consider the choice and implications of a variety of commonly seen relational contracts that well-informed family with di¤erent degrees of relational distance with the entrepreneur may o¤er: (1) bank loan guarantee, 10 (2) in-kind assistance to the entrepreneur that is tied directly to such as marriage, internal resource allocation and voluntary transfer, but not project …nancing. 7 Berger and Udell (1998) also provide extensive evidence of participation by alternative, informal sources in entrepreneurial …nance, including family and friends. 8 Relational and non-relational contracts may often co-exist. Alphonse et al (2004) …nd evidence of trade credit coexisting with bank loans. While the co-existence of relational and non-relational contracts has been widely recognized, there is little research on the interaction between such contracts. 9 There could be other advantages of family participants. They may have an edge over banks in monitoring and enforcing contracts. Credible fear of family ostracization may reduce entrepreneur's incentive to default making her eligible for bank loan.
1 0 Guarantees on loans are a common relational contract. Avery et al (1998) …nd, that in the U.S. about 40 percent of small business loans and close to 60 percent of loan dollars were guaranteed and/or secured by personal assets. the project, 11 and (3) gifts to the entrepreneur. 12 We …nd that a wealthy kin, irrespective of his altruism (or relational distance), can credibly signal the good entrepreneur. However when the kin is not too wealthy (de…ned explicitly later), the entrepreneur continues to be credit rationed if the kin's altruism exceeds a threshold level.
So, contrary to the existing …nance literature on the role of informal funding sources which does not separately account for family's altruistic traits, being informed about the entrepreneur is not a su¢ cient condition for resolving the problem of credit rationing. In addition, family's altruism (and wealth) have important implications for the mechanism used for signaling the entrepreneur's quality and facilitating bank …nancing. The alternative relational contracts are not perfect substitutes as they impose di¤erential costs on the family, provide di¤erential incentives to the entrepreneur and signal di¤erential degrees of credibility to the bank. 13 Finally, the kin's choice of relational contract in turn provides a pecking order of the entrepreneur's choice of kin, who di¤er in their level of altruism. She prefers a wealthy kin. However, if this is not possible, then she next prefers a kin with altruism in the intermediate range rather than too high or too low. In fact, there are kin with some levels of altruism that the entrepreneur would never choose, given that they cannot credibly signal the entrepreneur's quality. Our simplistic model also has broader implications for societal structure, institutional development and governance.
A number of papers explore the lemons problem in an adverse selection framework similar to 1 1 Assistance in kind is common within the family. For instance, parents often assist their child with contributions towards the down-payment for a child's house. They may o¤er to pay for her education rather than give a cash gift. Stories of start-ups having their beginnings in the family garage are also well-known now. 1 2 This is not an exhaustive list of possible …nancial contracts. A family member could also invest in the entrepreneur's project either in the form of equity or debt. We discuss these in Section 6 of the paper. 1 3 Relational distance, the source of the con ‡ict of interest, could be interpreted as the "bias" of the informed party. In that sense, our paper is about information transmission with a biased expert (namely, the informed family member). See Krishna and Morgan (2001) , Crawford and Sobel (1982) . However, in these papers, the transmission mechanism considered is "cheap talk" unlike alternative relational contracts we consider. ours. They di¤er in the mechanisms considered for addressing the problem. For instance, the micro…nance literature has discussed the use of group lending and dynamic incentives (Morduch (1999) ). However, it focuses more on the role of banks rather than on the informed party (such as family) while also ignoring the di¤erences in relational distance among those o¤ering relational contracts. Moreover, our paper permits the study of alternative relational contracts in a single uni…ed framework. 14 The paper on trade credit by Biais and Gollier (1997) is closest in spirit to our paper. They also consider an adverse selection problem where the buyer is credit rationed. Based on his information, the supplier pledges collateral to obtain a bank loan which he then extends as trade credit to the buyer. The bank, in turn, uses the supplier's action (along with its own independent signal about the buyer) to o¤er bank …nancing to the buyer thereby ameliorating the credit rationing problem.
However, unlike our paper, the supplier's information advantage is the necessary determinant of the buyer's bank …nancing. In Biais and Gollier, there is no role for relational distance, which lies at the center of our analysis. We show that information advantage is not a necessary condition for bank …nancing in our model. Moreover, the primary driver of supplier signaling in Biais and Gollier is the loan collateral, not trade credit. Our paper explicitly provides a unique role to both tied assistance and loan guarantee in signaling the entrepreneur's quality. 15 The …nance literature on family …rms largely focuses on control issues in such …rms, treating all family members as a uniform homogenous group (see Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Burkart, Panunzi 1 4 In a adverse selection framework, Myers and Majluf (1984) show that …rms would sequence their choice of …nancial instruments (pecking order) for project …nancing, using internal funds before debt …nancing. However, our analysis is focused on the co-existence and interaction between relational and non-relational contracts. 1 5 Unlike Biais and Gollier, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) is based on this feature of in-kind trade credit. However, contrary to their objective, family considers the use of in-kind transfer in our paper purely as a mechanism for signaling rather than a mode of assistance per se. Another paper, by Frank and Maksimovic (2004) , considers trade credit for its advantage in liquidating collateral. However, they o¤er no justi…cation for o¤ering in-kind assistance.
and Shleifer (2003) , Andersen and Reeb (2003) ). Our paper instead focuses not on control but on …nancing of new ventures. More importantly, we consider family members to be heterogeneous, based on relational distance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the idea of relational distance in greater detail. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 looks at the implications of relational distance on each of the alternative relational contracts in facilitating bank …nancing.
In Section 5, we sequentially consider the kin's choice of optimal relational contract and the entrepreneur's choice of kin. Section 6 brie ‡y discusses testable implications of the model for alternative societal structures and the rationale behind some key assumptions. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Relational Distance
The idea of "relationship" is frequently used in economics to justify transactions or outcomes that may otherwise not have occurred. Information advantage and repeated game are two commonly o¤ered bases for such relationships. While banks are reluctant to o¤er credit, suppliers are willing to extend trade credit to their buyers due to better information acquired through frequent interaction over the course of the economic relationship (Petersen and Rajan (1997) ). Thus, superior information provides an incentive to enter into relational contracts. Alternatively, even without informational concerns, a player may have an incentive to behave opportunistically, thereby eliminating any possibility of an economic relationship. However, if there is the possibility of repeated interaction, the long-term bene…ts from cooperating may outweigh the short-term gains from opportunistic behavior. Hence, cooperative relationship can be sustained, as in the case of Toyota and its suppliers in the Japanese auto industry (Holmström and Roberts (1998) ).
However, these two reasons alone cannot explain a number of other economic relationships or transactions. In reality, relationships are complicated and multi-dimensional, and are based on factors that go beyond information superiority and repeated nature of the transactions. For instance, executives of bankrupt …rms who are also members of some old boys'network are found to better access …nancial resources than those without such membership (Uzzi (1997) ). There may be no reason to believe that those providing the …nancing from the old boys' network know the executive well or that the executive is likely to need such assistance again in the future to be willing to not renege on her obligations towards the …nanciers. Similarly, a supplier who knows all her buyers equally well may still treat them di¤erently. She may allow one a greater delay in repayment than the other though both may have the same default likelihood. 16 Uzzi (1996) studies the structure of ties or relationships between manufacturers and contractors in the New York apparel industry. It provides compelling evidence in support of relationships based on factors besides information and repeated game. Many manufacturers have close ties with contractors who supply a signi…cant proportion of their output to the manufacturer. Uzzi …nds that some manufacturers share their decision to permanently relocate with their contractors well in advance of their impending departure. These are contractors with whom the manufacturer had an "embedded relationship". Standard game theory suggests that cooperation can be sustained in repeated games, but it unravels once the players know when the endgame occurs. If the manufacturer-contractor relationships were based on expectation of repeat play, news of the manufacturer's departure would terminate the incentive for cooperative play on the part of the 1 6 It is often di¢ cult to disentangle these alternative arguments. It is certainly possible that some member of the old boys' network knows the executive seeking …nancial assistance well which serves as an implicit guarantee for another member of the same network. The executive may also have an incentive to maintain her reputation if there are su¢ ciently high costs of stigma attached to reneging. Ultimately, these are empirical questions that need to be tested against data. to interact for long, on the basis of personality, institutional and cognitive factors. We use the term relational distance to refer to all these other in ‡uences, other than information and incentives from 1 7 It is worth noting that, like information acquisition, the other in ‡uences discussed above could also be the outcome of greater contact and cooperation. In fact, the evolution of social norms, including trust, fairness and reciprocity, are often the result of general day-to-day social intercourse. 1 8 See Cialdini (1993) for a detailed discussion on these factors. The marketing literature has long recognized the role of complex psychological factors that a¤ect consumer decision-making. For a general introduction, see the chapter on Consumer Behavior in Belch and Belch (2005) .
repeat play, on relational contracts.
to seek out other sources -namely, bank and the kin.
Assumption 2 : W < I.
This assumption, that kin's wealth is not su¢ cient to fund the entire project, ensures a role for bank …nancing. For simplici…cation, we normalize the return to a kin's wealth, the transaction cost of liquidating his wealth, the rate on bank deposits and the risk-free lending rate to zero.
Assumption 3 : The banks are competitive and earn zero expected pro…ts.
All through the analysis, a bank loan contract takes a very simple form. It speci…es the total loan extended and the interest charged, both of which have to be paid on a speci…c date.
Even though there must be a role for bank …nancing (by Assumption 2), the kin can participate in the process of project …nancing in a number of ways. We consider a few alternative relational contracts. The kin can make cash transfers in the form of gifts to the entrepreneur. He can choose to guarantee a bank loan to the entrepreneur. A guarantee is de…ned as an amount that a guarantor (kin in this case) promises to pay the bank in case of an entrepreneur defaulting on a loan repayment; but if there is no default, no cost is incurred by the guarantor. Alternatively, the kin can o¤er assistance in-kind speci…cally for the entrepreneur's project ("tied assistance") instead of giving the entrepreneur liquid wealth. Any liquid funds (gifts, for example) available with the entrepreneur is deposited in a bank earning the risk-free rate that is normalized to zero.
Assumption 4 : There is limited liability for the entrepreneur and the kin.
Funds that either the entrepreneur or the kin does not commit to a project cannot be laid claim upon in case of loan default.
Information and Payo¤s: There are two types of entrepreneurs -Good (E = G) with a positive NPV project, and Bad (E = B) with a negative NPV project. The positive NPV project generates a gross payo¤, X, with certainty, such that X I > 0. The negative NPV project generates X with probability p and zero otherwise, such that pX I < 0. There are no assets that can be liquidated if the project fails. The entrepreneur knows her type, while the bank does not. The prior probability of E = G is .
Assumption 5 :
If the bank is unable to distinguish between the two entrepreneur types, i.e., there is pooling of entrepreneur types, it charges a gross rate, , to break-even in a competitive industry. By assumption, at this rate it is unpro…table in expected terms for the good entrepreneur, and hence also for the bad entprepreneur, to undertake the project. This is the benchmark case. The lemons problem leads to underinvestment. For project …nancing to take place, the bank must be able to separate the good from the bad entrepreneur.
Time line: At date 0, nature chooses the type of the entrepreneur. Then, in the …rst period, the credit-rationed entrepreneur approaches her kin. The altruistic kin decides whether to participate or not participate; if he participates, his strategy requires him to choose one of the following tools -make a gift (P ), guarantee an entrepreneur's loan from the bank (C), or o¤er tied assistance (T ) related to the project. Based on the kin's action, the bank decides whether to extend a loan and the entrepreneur decides on whether to undertake the project. In the last period, payo¤s are realized and the game ends. We assume that the discount rate is zero.
Alternative Relational Contracts and Project Financing
In keeping with the extant literature on informal funding sources, we consider the case where the kin has better information about the entrepreneur than the bank. We make the extreme assumption that the kin knows the entrepreneur's type perfectly. While kin participation is necessary for bank …nancing, the kin can choose from alternative relational contracts, namely, gift, loan guarantee and tied assistance. In this section, we analyze the implications of these alternative relational contracts for the entrepreneur's access to formal bank credit. We determine separating equilibria under each of these relational contracts such that only positive NPV projects receive bank …nancing.
Gift-Giving
Gift-giving among family members is commonplace. The nature and size of the gift could vary signi…cantly, from ‡owers and garage space to estates, trust funds and business empires. For our purposes, we assume that gifts are made in cash and are therefore fungible.
Without …nancing considerations, the kin o¤ers P 2 [0; W ] to the entrepreneur so as to maximize his utility, U K = [(W P ) + P ]. Since 2 (0; 1), the kin will o¤er nothing to the entrepreneur, i.e., P = 0.
In the rest of the paper, we introduce the entrepreneur's …nancing requirements. Following the standard result that under information asymmetry, the good entrepreneur with su¢ cient initial funds can credibly signal her type to the bank (E-signaling). The minimum funds required to deter the bad type from mimicking, is given by 20
Since the entrepreneur does not have any funds, she can credibly signal her type only if the kin has "adequate" wealth (i.e., W W ) and is willing to o¤er it as a gift. Otherwise, there will be no E-signaling and no project …nancing.
Assume that the kin has adequate wealth. When would the uninformed kin be willing to o¤er such a gift? With the possibility of credible E-signaling, the kin would now weigh the cost of changing his actions against the bene…t of giving the entrepreneur the opportunity to signal by o¤ering the minimum gift, W , to her. The entrepreneur's utility includes the gift W , as well as the project payo¤ (X I) which the uninformed kin expects to be (X I). So, the kin's expected
The kin would prefer to o¤er a gift of W if and only if:
Proposition 1 A gift from the uninformed kin facilitates bank …nancing of the entrepreneur's project if and only if the kin has adequate wealth (W W ) and is su¢ ciently altruistic ( S ).
The Proposition above emphasizes the close linkage between relational and non-relational contracts and the important role of kin's altruism or relational distance. No kin, irrespecitve of his altruism, was willing to o¤er a gift when there were no …nancing considerations. But with project …nancing as a consideration, kin with higher levels of altruism are willing to o¤er a gift, i.e., when 2 ( P S ; 1). The gift-giving is motivated by the possibility that the entrepreneur may be willing to signal her type and obtain bank …nancing. These considerations do not require the kin to be informed about the entrepreneur. This is contrary to the existing literature's over-arching focus on the informational superiority of relational lenders, such as suppliers and moneylenders, in ameliorating the credit rationing problem. However, a particularly unaltruistic relative will not be willing to o¤er a gift, irrespective of his initial wealth. Altruism is not a su¢ cient condition for project …nancing.
Gift-giving -Case of Informed Kin
We now consider the case where the kin knows the entrepreneur's type perfectly and derive conditions for a separating equilibrium.
Absent …nancing considerations, the kin would prefer to o¤er no gift. So, with the possibility of a gift enabling bank …nancing, the kin would do so with the smallest possible gift. Let P E be the kin's gift to entrepreneur E = G; B. If the kin with the bad entrepreneur mimics the other kin by also o¤ering P G to enable a bank loan, the bad entrepreneur's payo¤ is [p(X I) + P G ], and the
The kin with the bad entrepreneur would prefer not to emulate the kin with the good entrepreneur with a gift if
i.e., if
which is feasible if and only if W p(X I)
(1 ) , i.e., i¤
So, kin with the good entrepreneur must o¤er a large enough gift (P G = p(X I)
(1 ) ) so as to deter mimicing by the kin with the bad entrepreneur. The higher the kin's altruism, the greater his incentive to mimic and hence larger the gift has to be (since P G > 0). Either entrepreneur type receives no gift (P G = P B = 0) from a kin with > P A . 2 1 This condition is the incentive compatibility condition of the kin with the bad entrepreneur (ICB). Given that for 1, the kin would otherwise prefer to not o¤er a gift, ICB holds with equality. So the participation condition for the kin with good entrepreneur, given by [(W P G ) + f(X I) + P G g] W , which when simplied gives P
, is satis…ed.
Proposition 2 Gift of size P G (= p(X I)
(1 ) ) from an informed kin can facilitate project …nancing to a good entrepreneur if and only if her kin has su¢ ciently low altruism ( P A ).
According to the above Proposition, a su¢ ciently large gift from su¢ ciently distant kin allows banks to separate the good from the bad entrepreneur. Greater a kin's altruism, greater the gift, and hence wealth, that would be required for a separating equilibrium. So, an entrepreneur requiring bank …nancing should either seek out distant kin, or close but wealthy kin.
Loan Guarantee
A loan guarantee is a promise on the part of a guarantor to compensate the bank with the value of the guarantee in case of default on a loan. While a gift is a permanent transfer of wealth from one party to another, a loan guarantee is a conditional contract between the guarantor and the bank. The willingness to o¤er a loan guarantee may signal the entrepreneur's quality to the bank.
But an uninformed kin would never prefer to o¤er a loan guarantee since the average project, by Assumption 5, has negative NPV. 22 Loan Guarantee -Case of Informed Kin
We now assume that the kin is perfectly informed about the entrepreneur. Let C E ; 8E = G; B be the level of loan guarantee o¤ered for an entrepreneur of type E. The standard literature considers the role of loan guarantee from the borrower in ameliorating the asymmetric information problem. 23 However, in our model, the guarantee comes from an informed third party, namely the kin, for a loan given to the entrepreneur.
In a separating equilibrium, a kin with a bad entrepreneur has no incentive to o¤er a loan guarantee, i.e., C B = 0. The good entrepreneur, on the other hand, obtains a loan at the risk-free rate (assumed to be zero). But for there to be a separating equilibrium, the kin with a good entrepreneur must o¤er a guarantee, C G , such that the kin with the bad entrepreneur has no incentive to mimic the former. If the kin with the bad entrepreneur succeeded in mimicing with C G and obtaining the risk-free loan, the bad entrepreneur would obtain a payo¤ of (X I) only if the project succeeds (with probability p) and zero otherwise. So, the bad entrepreneur's expected payo¤ would be p(X I). Her kin, on the other hand, would lose his collateral whenever the project fails (with probability (1 p)) thereby incuring the expected cost of (1 p)C G .
So, the kin with the bad entrepreneur would not mimic a kin o¤ering a loan guarantee to signal
Such a guarantee amount is feasible if and only if W W , i.e., i¤
Note, this condition is always satis…ed for W W , i.e., when the kin has "adequate" wealth, separation is feasible for all . The kin with good entrepreneur must guarantee a su¢ ciently large part of the loan. A potentially large exposure would therefore deter a kin with bad entrepreneur from mimicing. The incentive to mimic is lower for less altruistic kin. So, the wealth requirement for signaling is reduced for less altruistic kin than for the more altruistic kin. The wealth constraint would prevent the latter kin from signaling, even though the kin may have perfect information about the entrepreneur. Thus, the kin's altruism is critical in determinig the role of relational contracts in facilitating non-relational contracts. Kin's information advantage alone is not su¢ cient for signaling the good entrepreneur. However, if the kin is su¢ ciently wealthy, he can credibly signal the good entrepreneur type, irrespective of the level of altruism.
Tied Assistance
Tied assistance refers to kin support that is explicitly related to the entrepreneur's project, i.e., assistance in-kind. Instances of in-kind assistance are commonplace in a variety of contexts. Suppliers o¤er in-kind credit to their buyers. Parents often assist their child with contributions towards the down-payment for a house, or pay for her education rather than give a cash gift. If such in-kind transfer could be immediately or costlessly encashed, it would be identical to a cash gift. So we assume this is not possible. 24 Consequently, following an in-kind assistance, the loan amount is reduced by the size of the assistance. This is di¤erent from gifts as signals which allow the en-trepreneur to raise the entire investment amount as a bank loan. Furthermore, unlike a gift, the amount o¤ered as tied assistance is lost if the project fails.
If the kin is uninformed about the entrepreneur type, an o¤er of tied assistance to the entrepreneur reveals no information to the uninformed bank. So, the bank continues to charge the pooled interest rate, . By Assumption 5, there is no incentive for either entrepreneur type to undertake the project at this rate. Hence, the kin would not o¤er such assistance in the …rst place.
Tied Assistance -case of Informed Kin
Suppose instead that the kin has perfect information about the entrepreneur's type. Let T E ; 8E = G; B be the amount of tied assistance the kin o¤ers to an entrepreneur of type E.
Since T E gets consumed by the project, tied assistance can only be useful if it credibly signals the entrepreneur types. The kin with the bad entrepreneur would therefore have no incentive to o¤er tied assistance, i.e., T B = 0. As in the case of loan guarantee, for there to be a separating equilibrium the kin with the good entrepreneur must o¤er T G such that it imposes a su¢ ciently high cost of mimicing on the kin with the bad entrepreneur. 25 If the kin with the bad entrepreneur could successfully mimic the other kin with T G and facilitate a bank loan, the bad entrepreneur would obtain an expected payo¤ of p(X (I T G )). The kin prefers to not distribute the remaining (W T G ), using Lemma ??. So, the kin with the bad entrepreneur would not have an incentive to also o¤er
which is feasible if and only if the minimum required amount is less than the kin's wealth, i.e., i¤ If the kin has inadequate wealth, then he is able to use tied assistance to credibly signal a good entrepreneur only for low levels of altruism (given by (8) ). For kin with adequate wealth, he can credibly signal a good entrepreneur for all levels of the kin's altruism.The result for tied assistance as a relational contract is similar to that for loan guarantee. Neither relational contract is used unless the kin is informed. However, unlike a guarantee, the kin has to permanently transfer a part of his wealth irrespective of whether the project succeeds or fails. Tied assistance is similar to gifts as both result in permanent transfers from the kin to the entrepreneur. However, contrary to gifts, tied assistance have to be used in the project. As a result, Proposition 2 di¤ers from Proposition 4.
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Having considered the implications of each of the three relational contracts separately in the previous section, we now …rst consider the kin's choice among these alternative relational contracts.
We compare the kin's expected payo¤ under each of the three alternative contracts when there is a separating equilibrium. The kin's choice of contract a¤ects the entrepreneur. This would in turn a¤ect the entrepreneur's decision on which kin to approach, if such a choice were available to the entrepreneur. We determine factors a¤ecting the entrepreneur's choice of kin for the purposes of obtaining a non-relational contract in the form of a bank loan.
Kin' s Choice of Relational Contract
We …rst consider the case where the kin has inadequate wealth (i.e., W < W ). In the absence of …nancing considerations, the kin prefers not to have any contractual arrangements with the entrepreneur. Hence, with …nancing considerations, the kin must commit some funds, at least in expected terms, to credibly signal the good entrepreneur. A loan guarantee is merely a promise to pay the guaranteed amount in case of default, which by assumption never happens when the guarantee is a credible signal. 26 So, a credible loan guarantee is costless and hence the kin's most preferred relational contract. Both tied assistance and gift, on the other hand, involve an actual, permanent transfer of the kin's wealth to the entrepreneur, thereby always imposing a cost on the kin. However, unlike tied assistance which is used up in the project, a gift bene…ts the recipient whether or not the project is undertaken. So, all else equal, tied assistance is more credible than gift as a signaling tool. A kin would therefore need to o¤er a smaller amount of his wealth when using tied assistance to signal the entrepreneur type compared to a gift, making tied assistance the preferred relational contract over a gift.
We present the result in the following proposition.(The proof follows easily from comparing payo¤s of the kin with good entrepreneur under each of the relational contracts.)
Proposition 5 Any kin with inadequate wealth (W < W ) has a hierarchy of relational contracts to credibly signal the good entrepreneur, preferring loan guarantees to tied assistance to gifts.
The Proposition outlines the choice of contract for a not-too-wealthy kin with a given relational distance. He weighs the expected net bene…t from the alternative contracts in making his decision.
However, not all contracts may be available at di¤erent levels of . Once we determine the set of feasible relational contracts for di¤erent levels of relational distance, we can identify the kin's optimal choice of contract based on Proposition 5. Since tied assistance is more credible than a gift, the former can signal a good entrepreneur upto a higher threshold of , i.e., (4)). For any level of for which a gift is a feasible relational tool for signaling, tied assistance is also feasible. So, the kin never uses gifts as a relational contract for signaling a good entrepreneur (using Proposition 5). We also know that since loan guarantee is costless, it is the least credible and hence would serve to credibly signal a good entrepreneur at a lower threshold of , i.e., (6) and (8)). So, for any level of for which loan guarantee is a feasible relational tool for signaling, tied assistance is also available. But since loan guarantee is less costly than tied assistance, the kin prefers the former over the latter for 2 (0;
If, on the other hand, the kin has adequate wealth (W W ), since loan guarantee is costless to the kin under credible signaling, he will always choose this relational contract. 27 We summarize the result below. A su¢ ciently wealthy kin can entirely resolve the lemons problem faced by a good entrepreneur, irrespective of the kin's relational distance from the entrepreneur. 28 
Entrepreneur' s Choice of Kin For Credible Signaling
We assume that the entrepreneur has a choice of kin who are distinguished by their altruism towards the entrepreneur. Kin's choice of contract directly impacts the entrepreneur's payo¤. An entrepreneur looking for project …nancing would therefore choose a kin so as to maximize her own payo¤. For the purposes of the paper, the interesting case is to assume that the good entrepreneur prefers to undertake the project than just obtain the kin's wealth, i.e., X I > W .
The kin is characterized by his wealth and altruism towards the entrepreneur. Given project …nancing, the good entrepreneur prefers a kin who will also transfer part of his wealth. The greater the wealth transferred, the better o¤ is the entrepreneur. Since loan guarantee does not entail any such transfer in equilibrium, the entrepreneur would have a preference for a kin who would choose to o¤er tied assitance, i.e., a kin with 2 ( C A ;
T A ] who is not too wealthy. The good entrepreneur's resulting payo¤ would be (X I + T G ). In the absence of such kin, the entrepreneur would choose any other kin who is able to signal her type with a loan guarantee, thereby givng her a payo¤ of (X I), i.e., either any wealthy kin or not-too-wealthy kin with 2 (0; The Proposition above highlights a good entrepreneur's choice of kin for facilitating bank …nanc-ing. Besides being informed, the kin's relational distance is a critical determinant of the choice of kin and his relational contract. This is also re ‡ected in the non-monotonicity in the entrepreneur's choice of kin. While the entrepreneur may prefer a wealthy kin for su¢ ciently high and su¢ ciently low levels of altruism, she prefers a not-too-wealthy kin over a wealthy one for intermediate levels
T A ]).
Discussion
Our paper presents a framework for studying relational and non-relational contracts. Insights from this framework are useful for explaining empirical observations. Avery et al (1998) study the relationship between guarantee and small business loans. 29 In this context, they …nd the lack of a systematic relationship between commitment use and owner wealth rather surprising. Such an outcome is perfectly reasonable based on our model where both the wealthy and not-too-wealthy kin may o¤er a loan guarantee, with the not-so-wealthy kin doing so if and only if they have su¢ ciently low level of altruism. Therefore, our analysis indicates that allowing for a measure of altruism in the empirical analysis is critical for understanding the role of wealth in commitments towards credit.
Avery et al (1998) also …nd that personal commitments make up only 10% of total owner investment. Unfortunately, they do not look at the other components of owner investment. However, in our framework, the entrepreneur with not-so-wealthy kin most prefers a kin who o¤ers tied assistance. So, it would not be surprising if a large proportion of owner investment takes the form of tied assistance in the data for low income households.
Besides explaining documented empirical facts, this paper has implications for societal structure and institutions.
Implications of Societal Structure
Our theory has important predictions for the e¤ect of alternative societal structures, based on the interaction between economic well-being (wealth), relational distance, choice of contract and bank …nancing. While wealthy households choose guarantee irrespective of the relational distance, the outcomes vary for lower levels of wealth.
An important dimension along which societies may di¤er is the relation between the individual and group. In collectivist cultures, the relationship among individuals in a group is intense with high interdependence. On the other hand, there is more "detachment, distance, and self-reliance" in cultures that are individualistic (Triandis et al (1988) ). Individuals in such cultures would not subordinate their personal goals to those of the group, such as family or tribe. Thus, in the context of our model, individualistic societies are characterized by lower levels of than are collectivist societies. Thus, those within individualistic societies can credibly signal using guarantees rather than tied assistance (from 6).
(1) More (Less) individualistic societies should have a larger (smaller) proportion of bank loans with guarantees than with tied assistance.
This hypothesis is in line with the observation that as societies move from being collectivist to individualistic, there is also a shift in the nature of exchange between individuals. In particular, exchange becomes more generic ("universalistic") rather than individual-speci…c ("particularistic").
In that sense, tied assistance is less fungible and hence more speci…c than a loan guarantee.
Societies based on degree of individualism, as above, di¤er along the "strength of ties" spectrum.
However, a nuclear family, besides being close-knit, is also usually small. Joint family, on the other hand, has larger but more dispersed relationships. The bene…t of joint family is that there is a larger pool of members with low to choose from, as against nuclear families that will likely have a smaller pool and with higher . 30 It is di¢ cult for an entrepreneur from a nuclear family to choose a kin who may credibly signal. But larger the household, greater the number of loans it can be expected to have. By extension, we would also expect lower bank …nancing in economies characterized by nuclear family structures.
(2) More nuclear the family structure, lower the amount of bank credit.
At a macro level, could be thought of as a measure of trust in society. Our model has the counter-intuitive implication that an improvement (deterioration) in such trust would hinder (facilitate) signaling and reduce (increase) bank …nancing in the economy. Changes in trust could result for many di¤erent reasons. Adverse shocks may enhance trust among existing partners in a variety of ways. For instance, su¤ering brings people closer, shortening the relational distance.
On the other hand, it is also possible that adverse shocks may pull people apart in which case the e¤ect will be opposite. A recession characterized by excessive default may reduce people's sense of comfort. In this case, even if the underlying characteristics of the potential entrepreneur does not change, an observed willingness to extend support through guarantee or tied assistance would provide a stronger credible signal to the bank about the entrepreneur's quality. Hence, there would be more bank …nancing. 31 (3) An increase (decrease) in trust in society due to an exogenous adverse shock would reduce (raise) the amount of bank credit.
Implications for Institutional Development
The results in our paper suggest that social ties play a critical role in the absence of e¤ective formal institutions. With underdeveloped due-diligence capacity, society bene…ts if formal …nancial institutions rely on information embedded in social ties. Our framework suggests that there is a …ne line between the usefulness of these ties and cronyism in bank lending. Cronyism is most common amongst very closely-knit groups. With very short relational distance, there would be 3 1 Avery et al (1998) note that personal commitments in small business …nance may have grown in the 1990s due to recessionary factors such as weak commercial real estate markets. This conclusion is not at odds with what would be predicted by our model. However, their focus is on personal commitment which includes guarantees and collateral, rather than tied assistance. Moreover, in our simple model, we do not distinguish between various forms of personal commitment.
greater incentive to mislead the bank about the borrower quality. Bank lending based on cronyism would therefore serve to weaken the economy as a whole and the banking sector in particular. It is only in moderation that cronyism is useful, particularly in poorer countries.
Along these lines, our analysis also recommends caution against stringent "con ‡ict of interest" regulations prohibiting loans involving family participation. Consider pyramidal business groups which are widespread, not just in developing but also in developed countries such as Canada. By their very structure, such groups are characterised by a high degree of opacity making it di¢ cult for outsiders, such as banks, to value the investment opportunities within these groups. Relying on the "social" ties (measured by the stake of the …rm at the top of the pyramid in the …rm below) and contractual arrangements between these …rms in the business group could help outsiders make informed decisions. Governance-based regulations that aim to prevent lending to pyramidal groups could therefore lead to ine¢ cient outcomes.
The nature of kin's contracts should re ‡ect the institutional environment. A poor economy with an unenviable record of collateral claims resolution should expect to witness greater reliance on project-speci…c in-kind assistance, rather than loan guarantees, for facilitating bank loans. Gifts as a signal of entrepreneur quality would be few and far between. Thus, economies with inadequate institutions for facilitating these alternative relational contracts, such as an e¤ective judiciary, should undertake necessary institution-building measures to encourage such contracts. The inability to enter into preferred relational contracts adversely a¤ects the extent of bank …nancing.
Key Assumptions
The credibility and e¤ectiveness of a kin's signal relies on the bank knowing the exact level of the kin's altruism. Otherwise, a kin could misrepresent his true level of altruism. The bank in turn would anticipate such a possibility, which would dilute the credibility of the kin's signal. The net result will be one of lower bank …nancing and hence greater social ine¢ ciency. It is unrealistic to imagine that a bank would know precisely the level of a kin's altruism. However, for our results to go through, knowing the range rather than the exact value of a kin's altruism is mostly su¢ cient.
For instance, for a not-too-wealthy kin o¤ering tied assistance to an entrepreneur, as long as the bank knows that the kin's altruism lies in the range (0;
T A ], it would be willing to o¤er a loan (from Proposition 4). Such an assumption is not unrealistic. Banks frequently acquire such soft information over the course of their relationship with a borrower, or if the bank exists in a small close-knit community. Besides, one could consider the level of altruism to be a rank ordering of the distance of the relationship between kinship group members. For instance, it may be reasonable to assume that the altruism level of a parent is higher than that of an uncle.
Other Relational Contracts
Besides guarantee, tied assistance and gift-giving, there may be other options available to a kin -extending loans and taking equity stake or partnership in the entrepreneur's project, for example. One justi…cation for ignoring these options may be the ambiguity and informality in kinship …nancial dealings, making it di¢ cult to distinguish a loan or equity participation from a gift. However, it would be interesting to extend the current framework to explicitly study the implications of these choices.
Conclusion
Better information and mutual trust resulting from protracted interaction between players form the basis for contractual arrangements that may otherwise not be possible. In this paper, we show the role of relational distance in the interaction between relational and non-relational contracts.
We study this in the context of the social institution of family and its role in venture …nancing in a credit-rationed environment arising from asymmetric information. Unlike the existing literature on informed agents'role in …nancing, we explicitly consider the strength of the relationship between players who are party to a relational contract. In our model, altruism is necessary for facilitating bank …nancing. However, if the kin is not too wealthy, a very high level per se of altruism may be accompanied with greater under-investment even when one party (not the bank) is better informed about the borrower. In fact, entrepreneurs seeking bank …nancing are better o¤ searching for either rich relatives or relatives who are not too altruistic towards them. Furthermore, we show that some altruistic kin may facilitate bank …nancing even when they are not informed about the entrepreneur's quality. Thus, explicit consideration of relational distance, hitherto largely ignored in the literature, is critical.
Besides being critical for determining the credibility of a kin's signal, the relational distance between players also a¤ects the optimal choice of relational contracts. While the existing literature has ignored the role of relational distance between parties, it has also explored the implications of alternative contracts typically one at a time. However, by allowing for various contractual arrangements in a single model, we show that these relational contracts are not perfect substitutes since they impose di¤erential signaling costs on the kin, based on relational distance and wealth. In fact, the kin has a pecking order of relational contracts. Results of analyses that ignore relational distance or the interaction between alternative relational contracts are likely to be misleading.
The paper o¤ers us insights into the e¤ect of alternative societal structures, such as nuclear and joint families, and individualistic and collectivistic cultures, on bank …nancing. Some of these may be empirically tested with appropriate data. Our results have broad institutional implications regarding crony capitalism and con ‡ict of interest regulation.
